Incentives and Superstars on the LPGA Tour by Francisco Peschiera et al.
“Incentives and Superstars on the LPGA Tour”
by
Francisco J. Peschiera, Peter Hans Matthews and Paul M. Sommers
June, 2002




http://www.middlebury.edu/~econIncentives and Superstars on the LPGA Tour
Francisco J. Peschiera Peter Hans Matthews(*) Paul M. Sommers
Department of Economics Department of Economics Department of Economics
Middlebury College Middlebury College Middlebury College
Middlebury, VT 05753 Middlebury, VT  05753 Middlebury, VT 05753
First Draft: July 2001
Revised: October 2001
Under submission at Applied Economics
Abstract:  Following Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a, b), this paper explores the role of
incentives on the 2000 LPGA Tour. Overall, it finds them to have limited effectiveness.
Several possible explanations are considered, including unmeasured differences in both
abilities and courses and variations in the distribution of prizes across tournaments. The
existence of a “superstar effect” is also considered.
JEL Classification Numbers:  J33, L83
(*) corresponding author:  802/443-5591 (tel), 802/443-2084 (fax), pmatthew@middlebury.
edu2
Incentives and Superstars on the LPGA Tour
*
I. Introduction
What motivates individuals to do well, particularly in environments where effort is
difficult to observe or effort-based contracts are unenforceable? Are the financial incentives
embodied within “tournaments” (Lazear and Rosen, 1990) sufficient? In recent years labor
economists have studied professional sports tournaments to assess the incentive effects of
prize money on player performance.  Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a,b) focused on golf
tournaments because of the ready availability of information on the incentive structure (both
the total prize and its distribution) and individual output (players’ scores).  Using data from
the 1984 men’s Professional Golf Association (PGA) Tour as well as from the 1987 men’s
European PGA Tour, Ehrenberg and Bognanno find that higher prize levels do lead, ceteris
paribus, to lower scores.  In this paper, we ask whether or not the same incentive effects are
present among women who competed on the 2000 Ladies Professional Golf Association
(LPGA) Tour.  We estimate a half dozen “benchmark models,” and then consider the
possible consequences of unmeasured differences in player ability and course difficulty,
differences in responsiveness to incentives and the distribution of prizes, as well as the
differences in incentives for men and women. We also investigate the existence of a possible
“superstar effect” on the 2000 LPGA Tour.
                                                
*  We wish to thank, without implication, Jeff Carpenter, Carolyn Craven, John Craven, Jon
Isham, Bob Prasch and Scott Pardee for conversations about golf, incentives or both.3
II.  Methods and Data
The framework used here is similar to that used by Ehrenberg and Bognanno.  The
player’s score is affected by her effort or concentration level which in turn may be influenced
by ultimate financial rewards, measures of the player’s ability relative to her competitors’
abilities, various tournament specific factors such as the difficulty of the course, and a
random or luck component.
The typical tournament on the LPGA Tour involves four rounds.  Half of the field is cut
at the end of the second round.  Following two more rounds of play, monetary prizes are
awarded on the basis of the player’s rank relative to the rest of the field.  Of the thirty-six
tournaments on the 2000 LPGA Tour, twenty-three were of this type.  A complete list of the
tournaments included in our sample, the total and first place prize monies disbursed in each
tournament, and par and yardage for each course are presented in Table 1.
The LPGA Web site (www.golfonline.com/golfstats/lpgasearch.html) provides detailed
round-by-round results for each 2000 LPGA tournament with final rank and prize money
won by all players who completed four rounds of play.  The data set consists of the top 50
money winners on the 2000 LPGA Tour. Our reliance on a subset of elite golfers is intended
to mitigate the effects of the “marginal golfer” whose long run concerns with participation on
the Tour mean that “the level and structure of prize money in a tournament may not be an
accurate indicator of [her] marginal financial return to effort” (Ehrenberg and Bognanno,
1990a, 1311).
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1  Ehrenberg and Bognanno use a larger sample, but draw a distinction between “exempt” and
“non-exempt” players.4
The benchmark regression model (pooling the data across players and tournaments) is
the following:
SCOREij  =   0 +  1 PRIZEj +  2  MAJORj +  3 PARj +  4  YARDSj
                                             +  5 SAVEI +  6 MSAVEj +  ij
where the subindex ij is for player i in tournament j.  And:
SCOREij  =  four-round score of player i in tournament j;
PRIZEj  =  total prize money disbursed to all players in tournament j;
MAJORj  =  dummy variable for majors that takes the value 1 and 0 otherwise;
PARj  =  the four-round par score for the tournament course;
YARDSj  =  the total course yardage in tournament j;
SAVEi  =  player i’s four-round average score during the 2000 LPGA Tour;
MSAVEj  = mean value of SAVEi of all players who completed tournament j; and
ij   =  random error term.
If there are incentive effects among women, then higher purse totals should lead to
lower scores, and our estimate of  1 should therefore be negative.  Since winning a major
usually means more prestige and recognition in the media, then the expected sign on  2
should also be negative.
The expected signs for the coefficients on PAR and YARDS ( 3 and  4 , respectively)
should be positive.  The more difficult the course, the higher the player’s score.  Player
ability is proxied by SAVE.  The better the player’s overall performance on the 2000 LPGA
Tour, the lower the player’s score in any one tournament.  Hence, we would expect  5 > 0.
Finally, the quality of the other players in the field is proxied by MSAVE, the mean value of5
SAVE for all players who finished the tournament.  If there are incentives for individuals to
perform better in the face of tougher competition, then  6 will be positive.  If, however, the
presence of a strong field increases the costs of concentration/effort too much, the result
could be higher rather than lower scores (i.e.,  6 < 0).  Dixit’s (1987) model of strategic
behavior in contests suggests that the sign of this coefficient could turn on the presence of an
“odds-on favorite”:  under reasonable conditions, the absence of such a favorite is a sufficient
condition for “overcommitment” by all participants.
2
III.  Benchmark Results
The least squares regression results for our benchmark model of the 2000 LPGA Tour
are presented in Table 2. As anticipated, the more difficult the course (as measured by higher
pars and longer yardage), the higher the player’s score.  The better the player (as measured
by SAVE), the lower the player’s score in any particular tournament.  And, players’ scores
tend to be lower in majors, but not discernibly lower.
Curiously, higher purses seem to contribute to higher scores.  Perhaps only the very
best players are more responsive to financial incentives.  But, we observe the same pattern of
results for the top 20 and top 35 money winners as we do for the top 50 money winners.
                                                
2  In this framework, “overcommitment” is the choice of an effort level in excess of that
consistent with Nash equilibrium in the absence of opportunities for pre-commitment.  In
sports, Dixit (1987, 891) observes, such pre-commitment could be achieved by “merely
psyching oneself up (or down).”6
Although the coefficient is statistically significant, its economic significance is a matter of
debate: prize money would have to rise about $1.4 million to increase a player’s score by
more than one stroke per round.  Of the twenty-three tournaments included in our sample,
only two had prize money totals in excess of $1.4 million.
The competitive level of the rest of the field, measured by MSAVE, appears to hurt
rather than help individual players.  This pattern of results is remarkably consistent in all
tournaments, majors and non-majors alike.
Four of the six tournaments on the 2000 LPGA Tour with purses in excess of $1
million were majors.  Hence, some of the curious results we ascribe to PRIZE may in fact be
due to higher than average scores in majors.  Yet, when the dummy variable defined for
majors or individual scores in all four majors are excluded from the regression equation, the
estimated coefficient on PRIZE remains positive and statistically significant.  Even when we
remove the individual observations for Karrie Webb, the top money winner in 2000, PRIZE
is still directly related to SCORE.
IV.  Elaborations on the Benchmark Model
To evaluate the robustness of these results – in particular, the positive PRIZE coefficient –
we considered several extensions of our benchmark model. The first of these were “variable
coefficient” specifications, estimates of which are presented in Table 3. Following Ehrenberg
and Bognanno (1990b), for example, the first column reports the estimates of a fixed effects
model with golfer-specific intercepts, an attempt to capture otherwise unmeasured
differences in skills. The coefficients on PAR, YARDS, SAVE and, most important, PRIZE
are almost identical with those of our benchmark model, however, both in terms of size and7
statistical significance. There is a small increase in the size of the coefficient on MAJOR, but
its p-value remains high – that is, well in excess of 0.50.  There is also some, but not much,
effect on the MSAVE coefficient, and it remains significant: for a one stroke increase in the
mean average of the “rest of the field,” four-round scores are predicted to fall 3.10 rather than
2.97.  Because the introduction of individual fixed effects had little effect on this model – the
adjusted R
2 falls, in fact, from 0.248 to 0.233 – or other specifications, further discussion of
such effects is omitted.
The use of time or, in this context, course-specific fixed effects is also common with
pooled data, and the second column in Table 3 reports the estimates for such a model. Three
properties stand out: the adjusted R
2 more than doubles, to 0.550; the coefficient on SAVE is
almost identical in size but even more significant; and while the coefficient on PRIZE is also
doubled, it is now insignificant at the 10 percent level.  The first of these hints that PAR and
YARDS do not capture all of the differences in courses, while the third suggests that if these
differences are incorporated into the model, the effect of PRIZE on SCORE is muted. On the
other hand, while the estimated coefficients on PAR, YARDS and MSAVE are close to their
benchmark values, each is now insignificant at even the 50 percent level. Furthermore, each
of the course coefficients is also insignificant. Our sense is that this reflects a more collinear
set of independent variables and that, in practice, one must often choose between “behavioral
variables” and course-based fixed effects.
Even in those cases where it is not quite significant, however, the positive coefficient
on PRIZE remains a matter of concern, and it seems sensible to ask whether it reflects the
presence of a few “influential” observations. To this end, we first allowed the PRIZE
coefficient, rather than the intercept term, to differ across golfers, and the results are reported8
in the third column of Table 3 and Figure 1, a scatter plot of the 50 estimated PRIZE
coefficients and their associated t-statistics. The adjusted R
2 is smaller than in the benchmark
model, but the non-PRIZE coefficients are similar in size and significance.  More important,
however, none of the estimated PRIZE coefficients was negative, and of the 50 positive
coefficients, eight were significant at the 5 percent level, and one was significant at the 1
percent level. Furthermore, none of the coefficients exceeds 0.0065, and most are clustered
between 0.002 and 0.004, so that, once more, even a $100,000 increase in total purse is
predicted to have a small effect on individual scores.  The fourth column includes both
variable PRIZE coefficients and course-specific intercepts, with similar results: all of the
PRIZE coefficients are still positive, but just one of these is significant at the 5 percent level.
Combined, the third and fourth columns nevertheless provide further evidence that the
positive, albeit small, PRIZE coefficients in Table 2 are not a “statistical accident.”
Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a) observe that, in principle, both the total purse and
its distribution will affect incentives, but note that on the PGA Tour, this structure was
almost identical from one tournament to the next.  There was not much variation in structure
on the 2000 LPGA Tour either:  of the twenty-three tournaments in our sample, all but five
awarded the winner between 15.5 and 16.5 percent of the total purse.  Of these five, one was
more “egalitarian” – the Evian Masters, at 15 percent – while the other four (AFLAC
Champions, 17.4 percent; U.S. Women’s Open, 18.2 percent; Samsung World
Championship, 22.4 percent; Arch Wireless Championship, 23.0 percent) were less so.
Despite this small variation, we nevertheless attempted to determine whether our previous
estimates of the PRIZE coefficient reflected variations in tournament structure. To this end,
we separated the PRIZE variable into FIRST, the winner’s purse measured in thousands of9
dollars, and OTHER, the difference between PRIZE and FIRST, and re-estimated some of
the previous models. The results are reported in Table 4.
The first column is the benchmark specification with FIRST and OTHER substituted
for PRIZE. We first note that the estimated coefficients on PAR, YARDS, SAVE and
MSAVE are close to their previous values – the coefficient on MSAVE, which increases in
size to –3.25, is most affected – and remain significant, while the coefficient on MAJOR
more than doubles in size, but remains insignificant.  It is the coefficients on FIRST and
OTHER that stand out, however:  an increase in the prizes available to the “runners up” is
estimated to increase SCORE even more than before – 0.6 strokes per $100,000, rather than
0.3 – but an increase in the first place prize is estimated to reduce four-round scores, at the
rate of 1.3 strokes per $100,000.  (Some caution is called for here, however, since the
coefficient on OTHER is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while that on FIRST is
significant at just the 20 percent level.)  Furthermore, the hypothesis that the two coefficients
are equal – a restriction that is implicit in the use of PRIZE in the previous models – can
(just) be rejected at the 10 percent level.  The estimates are also consistent with those for
PRIZE alone: in the representative tournament, an increase of $100,000 in the total purse
means an increase of about $16,000 in the winner’s prize and $84,000 in the prizes awarded
to the rest of the field.  The former is predicted to reduce SCORE 0.21 strokes and the latter,
to increase it 0.52 strokes, with a combined effect of –0.21 + 0.52 = 0.31 strokes, which is
almost identical to predictions based on PRIZE alone.
The results for two other “two prize models” suggest that these numbers be treated
with some caution, however. The second column reveals, for example, that when fixed
course effects are introduced, the coefficient on FIRST becomes positive once more. Its10
value is too large to be sensible, however, and more important, is also insignificant. As
before, the addition of course-specific intercepts also overturns the significance of OTHER,
PAR, YARDS and MSAVE coefficients. The third column omits these fixed effects, but
allows the coefficients on FIRST and OTHER to vary across players, and Figure 2 is a scatter
plot of the 50 pairs of estimates. The significance of the non-prize coefficients is restored,
and their values are consistent with previous estimates. Figure 2 suggests the presence of a
small number of outliers. In particular, while the mean estimated coefficient on FIRST is
positive (0.159), the median is negative (-0.009). This pattern is reversed with the OTHER
coefficients: the mean (-0.025) is negative, and the median (0.006) is positive. We interpret
this to mean that the behavior of the “median golfer” is consistent with the results in the first
column.
Our tentative conclusion, therefore, is that the structure of tournament prizes matters
in the case of the LPGA, but perhaps not in the sense that the Lazear and Rosen (1990)
model predicts. In particular, the small, positive coefficient on OTHER, or on PRIZE in
previous models, still needs to be rationalized. The simplest explanation, perhaps, is that
financial rewards might stimulate workers to concentrate more, but among some professional
athletes, notably the top money winners on the 2000 LPGA Tour, these rewards have little
effect over a four-day tournament. That is, even when the coefficients on OTHER or PRIZE
are significant, their estimated values are small, consistent with the notion that for most
golfers, financial incentives had little effect on effort or concentration. This effect must be
more pronounced in women than men, however, if it is to explain the differences between
our results and Ehrenberg and Bognanno’s.  If so, female golfers, unlike their male
counterparts, do not “hoard” effort in less lucrative tournaments.11
A related explanation is that for women golfers, the relation between compensation
and incentives should perhaps be viewed in terms of a lifetime or career, not a single season.
If changes in productivity are revealed slowly over a worker’s lifetime, choosing a longer
period may be the only way to show the efficacy of incentive schemes.  After all, great oaks
from little acorns grow but, as anyone who has ever watched a great oak grow, it is not a
whoosh.  In graphical terms, the relationship between each golfer’s output (score) and total
prize could be (almost) horizontal in one season, but still slope downward when data from
several seasons are used.
A third possible explanation starts with the observation that the prizes available to
women are much smaller than those available to men – the 25th place finisher at the 2000 US
Women’s Open, one of the LPGA’s most lucrative tournaments, received $28,404, while her
counterpart at the US (Men’s) Open received $45,537 – and that differences in endorsement
opportunities exacerbate this “incentive gap.” It is possible, then, that even among the LPGA
elite, most will be reluctant to withhold or reduce effort in less lucrative tournaments and
some will choose a more “defensive” or “cautious” approach in more lucrative tournaments.
The former is consistent with a small PRIZE or OTHER coefficient, and the latter, with its
nevertheless persistent positive sign.
The negative coefficient on MSAVE, viewed in the context of earlier Dixit’s (1987)
observations on the consequences of “odds-on favorites” in contests, leads to a fourth
possible explanation, which we consider in more detail in the next section.
V.  Was There A “Superstar Effect” in 2000?12
There is some reason to be concerned that the 2000 season is a special case, because
of the presence of a “superstar” on the LPGA Tour. Karrie Webb participated in 16 of the 23
tournaments in our sample, and won 6 of them, including two majors, the Nabisco
Championship and the U.S. Women’s Open.  She also finished fourth or better at three
others, and earned $1.876 million, 25 percent more than her closest rival, Annika Sorenstam,
who won three tournaments of her own.  Furthermore, this dominance was evident from the
start: she won three of the first six tournaments in our sample.
Table 5 reports the results of our efforts to confirm, and perhaps measure, a possible
“superstar effect” on the 2000 LPGA Tour.  The entries in the first column, for example, are
the estimated coefficients of our benchmark model for the seven tournaments in which Webb
did not participate.  (Since she participated in all four majors, that variable is now omitted.)
The adjusted R
2 is quite small (0.14) but the coefficient on PRIZE is now negative,
substantial, and significant at the 5 percent level. In particular, in these tournaments, a
$100,000 increase in total purse is now predicted to reduce four-round scores two and a half
full strokes, other things being equal. This was not the only sign to change, however: the
coefficient on MSAVE is now positive and significant at the 1 percent level, which implies
that in Webb’s absence, a better field (lower MSAVE) produced lower scores, consistent
with Dixit’s (1987) results on the possible effects of favorites. Unfortunately, the coefficient
on PAR also “flips”: a one stroke increase in the four-round par is now associated with a one
stroke reduction in scores, a counterintuitive result.  The size and significance of the YARDS
and SAVE coefficients remain more or less unchanged, however.
The second column reveals that these results do not survive the addition of course-
specific intercepts, however.  The coefficients on PRIZE and MSAVE revert to their initial13
signs, but the former is now significant at the 10, not 1, percent level, and the latter becomes
insignificant.  Indeed, the coefficients on PAR, YARDS and MSAVE are all insignificant
and, despite the increase in the adjusted R
2, each of the course-specific coefficients is also
insignificant on its own.  Once more, it is unclear how much importance should be attached
to these results, but we report them for the sake of completeness.
The estimates for the model in the third column, in which the course-based fixed
effects are omitted but FIRST and OTHER are substituted for PRIZE, are more problematic.
The coefficient on FIRST is negative, significant but implausible:  an increase of $10,000 in
the winner’s purse is now predicted to reduce four-round scores more than five full strokes,
an almost nonsensical result. The coefficient on OTHER, 0.057, is somewhat more plausible,
but the coefficient on PAR is once more negative.  The constant, FIRST and OTHER are
almost collinear in this truncated sample, however, and it is possible that a few influential
observations have “contaminated” our estimates.
While the data are not conclusive, then, there is at least some evidence of a superstar
effect on the 2000 LPGA Tour, an effect closer in spirit to Frank and Cook (1995) than, for
example, Rosen (1981): the presence of the Tour’s best player in a tournament appears to
reduce, and in some cases reverse, the responsiveness of others to financial incentives. The
implications for internal labor markets, where the use of tournament-based incentives is also
common, are dramatic: where salespersons are compensated, at least in part, on the basis of
relative output, or managers are promoted on the basis of relative performance, for example,
the presence of a superstar could undermine otherwise effective incentive schemes.
VI. Conclusion14
The results presented in this paper suggest that, on the whole, total tournament prize
money has a small effect on LPGA player performance, but in ways that were not at first
anticipated. The total purse has just the opposite effect on scores of top money winners on
the LPGA Tour that it has in men’s PGA tournaments.  On the LPGA Tour, higher total prize
money does not lead to better (that is, lower) scores.  This puzzling result is not easily
explained. The possibilities considered here included unmeasured differences in player
ability and/or course difficulty, differences in the responsiveness to financial incentives, the
structure of these incentives, the choice of time horizon, the differences in incentives for men
and women and last, the existence of a “superstar effect.”
To these we should perhaps add one “non-economic” explanation.  It is also possible
that among even elite women golfers, money may not be the powerful motivator it is among
men. Some workers seek job enrichment, with money, in the words of Kerr (1997), “merely a
vestigial, low-order need that is or isn’t met along the way.” Our results are also consistent
with the view that professional women golfers may more actively pursue other, loftier goals
or less easily quantifiable nonfinancial rewards (recognition, performance feedback, greater
responsibility) than their male counterparts.15
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The Office Depot $ 704.1 112.5 72 6297
Subaru Memorial of Naples 799.0 127.5 72 6328
Australian Ladies Masters 712.4 112.5 72 6300
Welch’s/Circle K Championship 656.7 105.0 72 6222
Standard Register Ping 794.7 127.5 72 6392
Nabisco Championship 1200.6 187.5 72 6520
Longs Drugs Challenge 658.5 105.0 72 6388
The Philips Invitational 795.5 127.5 70 6101
Electrolux USA Championship 749.5 120.0 72 6431
LPGA Corning Classic 753.9 120.0 72 6062
Kathy Ireland Greens.Com Classic 704.1 112.5 72 6231
Wegmans Rochester International 943.5 150.0 72 6162
Evian Masters 1800.0 270.0 72 6091
McDonald’s LPGA Championship 1308.9 210.0 71 6376
Jamie Farr Kroger Classic 940.1 150.0 71 6319
U.S. Women’s Open 2744.4 500.0 72 6540
du Maurier Classic 1121.9 180.0 72 6403
Weetabix Women’s British Open 1093.6 178.8 73 6285
Oldsmobile Classic 708.8 112.5 72 6191
New Albany Golf Classic 935.0 150.0 72 6279
Samsung World Championship 677.9 152.0 72 6378
AFLAC Champions 701.2 122.0 72 6231
Arch Wireless Championship 935.0 215.0 72 6497
aTournament names in italics are majors.
bTotal prize money disbursed (in thousands of dollars).
c First prize money (in thousands of dollars).17
Table 2.  Regression Results of Player Four-Round Scores,
2000 LPGA Tour
Top 50 Top 50 Top 50
Explanatory Top 50 Top 35 Top 20 excluding excluding excluding
variable money money money variable on Karrie observations
winners winners winners MAJOR Webb on MAJOR
Constant 632.0 702.2 562.5 628.4 629.7 583.5
(2.71) (2.63) (1.71) (2.70) (2.66) (2.11)
PRIZE .0028 .0033 .0024 .0027 .0028 .0039
(4.16) (4.31) (2.44) (4.79) (4.13) (3.24)
MAJOR -.313 -.948 -.013 -.224
(-0.33) (-0.86) (-0.01) (-0.24)
PAR .364 .392 .302 .366 .362 .309
(2.88) (2.56) (1.51) (2.90) (2.84) (1.88)
YARDS .014 .014 .015 .014 .014 .016
(6.04) (5.00) (4.00) (6.40) (5.94) (5.27)
SAVE 1.085 1.070 1.027 1.085 1.071 1.090
(9.83) (8.71) (6.32) (9.83) (8.84) (7.65)
MSAVE -2.970 -3.222 -2.619 -2.953 -2.946 -2.787
(-3.65) (-3.50) (-2.33) (-3.64) (-3.56) (-2.95)
Adjusted  R
2 .248 .252 .233 .249 .239 .193
Sample size 671 504 298 671 655 548
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.18
Table 3.  Regression Results for Variable Coefficient Models
___________________________________________________________
Fixed Yes. Yes. No. Yes.
Effects? Players. Courses. Courses.
___________________________________________________________
Constant 649.4
   (2.58)
PRIZE .0028 .0054 Variable Variable
(4.06) (1.53) See Fig. 1
MAJOR -.442 -.773 -.370 -1.116
(-0.46) (-0.13) (-0.38) (-0.12)
PAR .364 .467 .378 .528
(2.82) (0.52) (2.83) (0.55)
YARDS .014 0.009 .015 .008
(5.90) (0.50) (5.98) (0.38)
SAVE 1.100 1.080 1.155 1.178
(9.65) (12.62) (4.24) (5.62)
MSAVE -3.096 -4.103 -3.128 -4.373
(-3.71) (-0.59) (-3.67) (-0.60)
Adjusted R
2 .233 .550 .201 .533
Sample size 671 671 671 671
_____________________________________________________________19
Table 4.  Regression Results for “Two Prize” Specifications
_________________________________________________________





FIRST -.013 4.46 Variable
(-1.35) (0.50) (See Fig. 2)
OTHER .0062 .0054 Variable
(2.82) (1.53) (See Fig. 2)
MAJOR -.649 -.774 -1.098
(-0.68) (-0.13) (-1.03)
PAR .362 .467 .383
(2.87) (0.52) (2.78)
YARDS .016 0.009 0.016
(6.21) (0.50) (5.68)
SAVE 1.084 1.080 1.091
(9.84) (12.62) (3.72)
MSAVE -3.251 -4.103 -3.50
(-3.92) (-0.59) (-3.75)
Adjusted R
2 .250 .550 .167
Sample size 671 671 671
______________________________________________________20
Table 5.  Regression Results for Tournaments without Karrie Webb
__________________________________________________________











PAR -1.008 2.861 -1.638
(-3.39) (1.12) (-5.32)
YARDS .028 -.041 .040
(4.69) (-0.60) (6.51)
SAVE .700 .721 .733
(3.73) (5.00) (4.14)
MSAVE 8.170 -11.605 14.039
(2.83) (-0.81) (4.74)
Adjusted R
2 .142 .503 .238
Sample size 191 191 191
___________________________________________________________21
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